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Training Foreign Militaries for Peace – U.S. IMET and
Militarized Interstate Disputes 1976-2007
Abstract
How do U.S. International Military Education and Training programs affect the recipient
states` behavior in militarized interstate disputes? While the relationship between U.S.
military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer and MID involvement has been
studied extensively in international relations literature the effects of U.S. IMET programs
on the same phenomena has been largely ignored. This study intends to fill some of this
gap. This paper proposes that American educated and trained foreign military personnel
return home with a better understanding about the role of the military as an instrument of
national power, civil-military relations, and the cost of war. These military personnel advise
their political masters against the use of military force during international disputes
leading to a decreased probability of both MID initiation and escalation. To test this
argument the analysis employs a merged dataset from the Correlates of War Projects and
the most prominent U.S. IMET and coups data. Using logistic regression analysis this study
finds that more U.S. IMET support a country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs. The
analysis also finds that countries that receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to escalate
ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.

This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss1/
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Introduction
How do U.S. International Military Education and Training (U.S.
IMET) programs affect the recipient states’ behavior in Militarized
Interstate Disputes (MIDs)? While many international relations
scholars have studied the relationship between U.S. military aid in the
form of arms and equipment transfer and MIDs the effects of U.S.
military aid in the form of foreign military education and training on
the same phenomena is scant. Besides leaving this less tangible, but
important variable out from previous studies this research agenda
requires further exploration due to the contradicting results of prior
research. While theoretically all previous studies agree that U.S.
military aid improves the military capabilities of the recipient states,
some studies argue that this improvement is associated with higher
probability of interstate conflict initiation while others find the
opposite relationship.1 At the same time, some studies even suggest
that there is no relationship between U.S. arms and equipment transfer
and armed conflict involvement.2
This article intends to contribute to this ongoing debate about the
relationship between U.S. military aid and conflict involvement by
systematically assessing how U.S. military aid in the form foreign
military education and training programs influence the probability of
recipient states becoming interstate conflict initiators and escalators.
The scope of this investigation focuses only on MIDs and one of the
fourteen U.S. foreign military education and training programs, the
International Military Education and Training programs.3 The U.S.
IMET programs are the focus of this investigation because they are the
largest in size and budget; have the most clearly defined goals and
being subject to continuous scrutiny from policymakers and the U.S.
Congress. Additionally, since one of the goals assigned to the U.S.
IMET programs by the U.S. Congress is to support regional stability
and decrease the likelihood of armed conflict between countries the
results of this investigation provide direct policy feedback as well.4
To be able to answer the research question and provide policy feedback
related to the effectiveness of U.S. IMET programs this analysis builds
on the general theoretical frameworks of the previously listed studies
and suggests that military aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs also
improves the military capabilities of the recipient states. However, this
article proposes that while military aid in the form of arms and
equipment transfer improves the more tangible, hardware related
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elements of the recipient states’ militaries, the U.S. IMET programs
improve a less tangible factor, the military human capital. This article
argues that the improvement in the military human capital is due to the
foreign military personnel’s exposure to the professional norms and
values of the U.S. military during the U.S. IMET programs. This study
theorizes that the more education and training foreign military
personnel receive in the U.S. IMET programs the better understanding
they will have about the professional military norms and values, the
role of the military as an instrument of national power, appropriate
civil-military relations, the value of cooperation and the human and
financial costs of war. Based on this improved understanding returning
graduates of the U.S. IMET programs advise their civilian masters
against the offensive use of military force in case of an interstate
dispute, which reduces the probability of interstate conflict initiation.
Empirically the analysis finds that indeed the more U.S. military aid
countries receive in the form of U.S. IMET participation the less likely
that they initiate interstate conflicts. Additionally, the results of the
statistical models also show that more U.S. IMET participation is also
associated with a decreased probability of escalating ongoing MIDs to
the higher levels of hostility. The study proceeds in six parts.
To establish a strong foundation this article starts with a review and
discussion of the most significant previous literature that explores the
causes of conflict initiation. Next, the article proceeds with the
development of a theoretical argument explaining how participation in
the U.S. IMET programs improves the military human capital of the
recipient states and why this improved military capability is associated
with a decreased probability of interstate conflict initiation and
escalation. Next, the study discusses the research design, the data
sources, and the empirical strategy. Then, the study presents the
empirical analysis and discusses the main findings. Finally, the article
concludes with a short summary of the findings and contributions
alongside with some potential policy implications and ideas for further
research.

Literature Review: Theories of MID Involvement
Militarized interstate disputes are military conflicts among two or more
sovereign states involving non-accidental, government-sanctioned,
overt, and explicit threats, displays, or uses of military force, with the
potential of escalating to war.5 Many international relations scholars
have investigated the question of why some countries become involved
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in such conflicts. Some scholars suggest that the variation in this
phenomenon is due to the difference in countries’ regime types.6 Others
argue that alliances play a crucial role in states’ international conflict
behavior. 7 While according to the findings of several studies
membership in alliances increase the probability of countries becoming
aggressive others suggest that certain types of alliances prevent its
members to become instigators of MIDs. Additionally, several
researchers find that military capabilities that states possess determine
whether a country becomes involved in MIDs.8 In relation to the
military capabilities argument several studies also investigate the
effects of foreign military aid on MIDs.9 This study intends to
contribute to this latter literature by exploring their theoretical
arguments from a different angle and expanding on their empirical
methods and findings.
The studies that assess the relationship between foreign military aid
and probability of the recipient countries’ international conflict
involvement divide into two groups: The encouragement and the
discouragement arguments. Those studies that belong to the former
group argue that more foreign military aid in the form of arms and
equipment transfer increases the probability of MID involvement.10
Contradictory to these arguments the restraint literature proposes that
military arms and equipment transfer reduces the probability of MID
involvement of the recipient states.11 These studies suggest that this
type of military aid improves the recipient countries’ military
capabilities and this improved capability enables the recipient states to
deter potential foreign aggressors. Furthermore, they suggest that
military aid increases the recipient states’ perception of security, which
reduces their incentives to initiate MIDs.
Although all these studies make significant contributions to the overall
research, agenda they also leave some room for potential improvement
and expansion. This study suggests that the contradicting results of the
previous studies are due to their different research designs (case
studies versus large-N analysis) and their use of different proxies for
measuring foreign military aid. Furthermore, the authors’ limited
regional scopes and the small number of cases compared to worldwide
large-N studies might also contribute to the contradicting empirical
findings. Besides these challenges, all of these studies only assess the
relationship between foreign military aid in the form of arms and
equipment transfers and MID involvement, while systematically ignore
the potential effects of U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military
45
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education and training. The inclusion of this variable into this research
agenda is important for several reasons.
First, the U.S. foreign military education and training effort makes up
quite a substantial part of the overall U.S. military aid efforts since for
example in fiscal year 2015 the United States provided $876.5 million
worth of U.S. IMET training to about 76,400 students from 154
countries.12 Second, several previous studies argue that without well
trained and educated military personnel the availability of complex
modern weapons or large military budget are not sufficient to increase
a country’s military capabilities.13 Furthermore, other scholars suggest
that state military capabilities do not only depend on tangible factors
such as number of military personnel, number of major weapon
systems (tanks, airplanes, ships), possession of nuclear capability, but
also on less tangible elements including the availability of well trained
and educated military personnel. Finally, some studies also suggest
that without highly trained and educated military personnel states’
military forces cannot be successful in modern conflict.
Through the introduction of the U.S. IMET programs into the
investigation of the relationship between U.S. military aid and MID
involvement and focusing on the effects of military human capital this
article establishes a new approach within this research agenda. Finally,
the introduction of a different type of military aid might also help
decide the debate between the encouragement and the discouragement
literature.

Theory of U.S. IMET and MID involvement
The United States delivers military aid to the recipient states in two
forms: Arms, equipment transfers, foreign military education, and
training programs. One of the main goals of both types of U.S. military
aid is to improve the military capabilities of the recipient states so they
can deter foreign aggression and defend themselves in case of an armed
conflict.14 While U.S. military aid in the form of arms and equipment
transfer improves the recipient states’ military capabilities through
better hardware the U.S. IMET programs improve the recipient states’
military human capital.15 Since without well trained and educated
military personnel the availability of complex modern weapons is not
sufficient to increase a country’s military capabilities countries that rely
on U.S. foreign military aid are incentivized to also improve their
military human capital through U.S. IMET participation. The different
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U.S. IMET programs provide a unique framework for foreign militaries
to improve their military human capital for several reasons.
First, the U.S. military is currently the best military force in the world
and possess the best military educational and training programs.16
Additionally, the U.S. IMET programs are unique because the U.S.
military accumulated decades of war experiences. Furthermore, the size
and modernity of the U.S. training infrastructure, the availability of an
experienced and combat focused training cadre, and the size of the
budget available for education and training purposes cannot be
compared to any other country’s similar programs. Besides these
factors, foreign military also send their military personnel to the U.S.
IMET programs, because militaries around the world admire the
professional norms, values, and procedures of those foreign militaries
that have won victories in recent wars or have gone through major
technological developments.17 Military organizations emulate the
norms and procedures of those victorious examples even if those norms
and procedures do not fit the strategic interest of the given countries.18
The author argues that the implementation of an American style
military, following the dramatic victory in the Gulf Wars, in countries
like Botswana, Monaco or Micronesia are clear examples of such norm
emulation.19 Based on this argument this article proposes that most
foreign militaries admire the recent victories and technical
advancement of the U.S. military and want to emulate its norms and
values.
Foreign military personnel who participate in the U.S. IMET programs
absorb the U.S. military’s distinct and highly professional identity as
well as its core values, which significantly improves the professionalism
of the recipient states’ military as a whole.20 Furthermore, several
scholars argue that the more professional a military considers itself, the
higher the temptation to be involved in state affairs both domestically
and internationally. Furthermore, the U.S. IMET programs teaches
participants about the role of the military as an instrument of national
power, about appropriate civil-military relations and the potential cost
of an interstate war. Additionally, as a part of their training U.S IMET
graduates learn about the importance of quality military advice in the
foreign policy making process and how even low or mid-level military
leaders can indirectly affect high level decisions.
Based on these arguments this study theorizes that U.S. IMET program
graduates return home as more professional and more capable soldiers
47
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with the ability and willingness to influence political leaders directly or
indirectly. Due to their participation in the best and most respected
military education and training programs U.S. IMET graduates
improve the military’s respect within their home society and increase
the military’s role in government policy determination.21 Other scholars
suggest that the graduates of the U.S. IMET programs do not only
become more professionals, but also senior military leaders with
significant political influence and responsibility.
The article also suggests that recipient states’ political leaders listen
more to the military advice of the U.S. IMET graduates than those
military leaders who have never attended American education and
training. This is the case because the political leaders send military
personnel to the United States with the goal to obtain better educated
and trained military human capital. They understand that the U.S.
IMET programs are the best military education and training
opportunity in the world and because of that, they listen to the advice
of the U.S. IMET graduates more than those who were never educated
or trained in the United States. U.S. IMET graduates base their military
advise on the norms and values they learn in these programs. They
return home with a better understanding about the role of the military
as an instrument of national power, about appropriate civil-military
relations, the importance of diplomacy and international cooperation,
and the potential cost of an interstate war. Due to these factors when
time comes to advise political leaders regarding the potential use of
military force in an international dispute U.S. IMET graduates are
more likely to caution their political masters against such aggression
than those military leaders who has not participated in such U.S.
education and training programs. These assertions lead to the first two
testable hypotheses:
H1: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET
support are less likely to initiate MIDs.
H1a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a
country receives the less likely it initiates MIDs.
If the U.S. IMET graduates are less likely to promote the use of military
in case of an international dispute than it is also logical that they will
advise against escalating ongoing MIDs to higher levels of hostility.
According to the Correlates of War (COW) dataset MIDs have five
categories based on the level of hostility in an ongoing conflict. These
48
https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol14/iss1/3
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.14.1.1822

Fabian: Training Foreign Militaries For Peace

five categories include no militarized action, the threat of use of force,
display of force, use of force and full war. This article argues that U.S.
IMET graduates provide military advise based on the norms and values
they learn in the U.S. IMET programs and due to these they advocate
for the use of military force only as the last resort in international
disputes. Furthermore, if the political leaders of the recipient states
indeed listen to the advice of the U.S. IMET graduates than U.S. IMET
participation must be associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict
escalation. Based on this argument two additional hypotheses arise:
H2: In comparison of countries, those receiving U.S. IMET
support will be less likely to escalate interstate conflicts to the
higher levels of hostility.
H2a: In comparison of countries, the more U.S. IMET support a
country receives the less likely it escalates interstate conflicts to
the higher levels of hostility.

Research Design
To assess the effects of U.S. IMET programs on the recipient states’
international conflict behavior and to ensure to include many potential
alternative explanations presented in the previous studies the author
generated a new dataset by the merging of four frequently used existing
datasets. The analysis uses the Correlates of War (COW) Militarized
Interstate Dispute data set version 4.3, the COW National Material
Capabilities dataset version 5.0, the COW Formal Alliances dataset
version 4.1, and the U.S. IMET and coups dataset.22 The new dataset
contains 3,558 observations. The unit of analysis is country-year.
The study utilizes two dependent variables: MID initiation and MID
escalation. To operationalize the first dependent variable the analysis
employs the COW MID dataset initiator variable. This is a dichotomous
variable, which is coded 0 if a country did not initiate the given conflict
within a given year and 1 if it did initiate the MID. The second
dependent variable is COW MID dataset’s levels of hostility ranges
from 1 through 5, according to the following scale:
1 = no militarized action
2 = the threat of use of force
3 = display of force
4 = represents the use of force
49
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2021

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 14, No. 1

5 = full war.
The key explanatory variable of this article is U.S. military aid in the
form of U.S. IMET programs. The article derives three versions of this
variable from the U.S IMET and coups dataset. The first independent
variable is a binary variable coded 0 if the country does not receive any
U.S. IMET and 1 if the country does receive military education and
training from the United States. The second version of the independent
variable is the number of U.S. IMET students. Since increasing a
country’s military capacity through the improvement of its human
capital takes time the analysis uses the logged five-year sum of U.S.
IMET students measuring the total number of U.S. IMET participants
of a given country during the five years prior before the actual MID
started. Finally, since the U.S. IMET programs are different in both its
content and its duration, the analysis employs a third version as well to
account for this variance. The study also employs the logged sum of 5year total U.S. IMET spending to ensure the robustness of the findings.
Next, the analysis aggressively controls for potential cofounding
variables and derive the controls from the most widely cited literature
addressing the potential causes of militarized interstate dispute
initiation and escalation. The first control variable is U.S. military aid.
The study uses the military aid variable from the U.S. IMET and coups
dataset to account for the effects of U.S. military aid in the form of arms
and equipment transfer. This variable measures the amount of U.S.
military aid as a percentage of the recipient country’s GDP. The next
control variable is regime type. This binary variable is coded as 1 if the
regime qualifies as democracy based on the authors’ requirements and
0 if it does not.23
The analysis derives the next control variable from the literature that
argues that alliances play a crucial role in states’ international
behavior.24 To account for the potential effects of different alliances this
analysis employs three alliance variables (defense, nonaggression, and
entente) from the COW Formal Alliances dataset version 4.1 and
accounts for neutrality. Since many scholars have argued in previous
literature that U.S. affiliation might improves states’ security
perceptions and reduces their incentives to initiate interstate conflict
this article also controls for this potential effect.25 This variable is
continuous and measured on a scale between -1 and +1 where, -1 means
no U.S. affiliation in a form of bilateral military agreement, while +1
means U.S. security guarantee for the given state.
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The next variable controls for the possession of nuclear capabilities.
The variable is coded 0 if the country does not have nuclear weapons
and 1 if the country possesses such capabilities. Additionally, following
the controls used in previous studies this analysis controls for the
potential effects of national capabilities. The article uses the GDP, the
iron and steel production ability, the total population size, the military
expenditure, and military size data from the Correlates of War National
Material Capabilities dataset version 5.0. Last, but not least to address
potential endogeneity problem the analysis includes a variable to
account for the potential effects of ongoing conflicts. This variable is
coded 0 if a country is not involved in a civil war and 1 if it does.

Results and Discussion
Table 1 and Table 2 exhibit the findings from eleven logistic regression
models assessing the effects of the U.S. IMET programs on the
probability of becoming the initiator of MIDs. The analysis interprets
the results simply as variables with negative coefficients are associated
with a decreasing probability of becoming an interstate conflict
initiator. The results of the models provide evidence for the proposed
theory and support H1 and H1a. All three forms of U.S. IMET variables
show the expected negative relationship with MID initiation and all
results are statistically significant. This means that those countries that
receive U.S. IMET support are less likely to become the initiators of
MIDs. Besides demonstrating that U.S. IMET participation is
associated with a decreasing probability of interstate conflict initiation
the models also show some additional interesting empirical findings.
First, across all the models the other U.S. military aid variable
demonstrates a statistically significant positive relationship with
interstate conflict initiation. These findings provide support for the
arguments of the encouragement literature and suggest that U.S.
military aid in the form of arms and equipment transfer indeed
associated with a higher probability of MID initiation.
Table 1. U.S. IMET Participation and MID Initiation, 1976 - 2007
(1)
IMET
Binary

VARIABLES
IMET

-0.722***
(0.121)

(2)
IMET
Students

(3)
IMET
Spending

(4)
Other Aid

(5)
IMET
Binary

(6)
IMET
Students

-0.745***
(0.178)
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IMET (stud.)

-0.105***
(0.0183)

IMET (spend.)

-0.133***
(0.0276)
-0.0708***
(0.0135)

Other Aid

2.948***
(1.132)

Defense

2.705***
(0.0947)

2.431***
(0.0654)

2.493***
(0.0720)

2.115***
(0.0730)

-0.182
(0.191)
0.173
(0.161)
-0.179
(0.155)
-0.325*
(0.191)
1.52e-08**
(6.68e-09)
0.000639*
(0.000345
)
1.25e-05
(8.25e-06)
4.58e06***
(1.70e-06)
-0***
(0)
-0.0973
(0.198)
0.856***
(0.161)
-0.437
(0.328)
-0.922***
(0.218)
2.305***
(0.238)

3,558

3,558

3,558

2,863

2,696

Non-aggression.
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size

Iron/Steel
Total Pop.

GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

-0.201
(0.191)
0.177
(0.162)
-0.143
(0.156)
-0.347*
(0.192)
1.29e-08*
(6.69e-09)
-0.000626*
(0.000348)

2,696

1.54e-05*
(8.31e-06)
4.56e-06**
(1.79e-06)
-0***
(0)
-0.0377
(0.199)
0.960***
(0.165)
-0.526
(0.330)
-0.997***
(0.220)
1.972***
(0.209)

Source: Author
Notes: Parentheses include Standard Errors in all tables: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1

Furthermore, since variables employed to account for different
alliances do not demonstrate any clear and significant association with
MID initiation the results do not seem to support those arguments
suggesting that alliances play a crucial role in a state becoming a MID
initiator. Additionally, the results of this article do not seem to support
the regime type related arguments because the regime type variable
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shows mixed results. From those variables that account for the effects
of states’ national capabilities all seems to have some significant effects
on the probability of MID initiation. The analysis suggests that as a
country’s military expenditure, population size and iron and steel
production capability increase the likelihood of being a MID initiator
also increases. At the same time countries with larger army, size seems
to be less likely to become the instigators in interstate conflicts.
Additionally, while the results of the models do not support those
arguments suggesting that the possession of nuclear weapons effects
whether a state becomes the instigator in interstate conflicts they do
provide support to the findings of prior research suggesting that
ongoing civil wars make it more likely that countries become involved
in MIDs. Finally, the result suggests that close U.S. affiliation is
associated with a decreased probability of MID initiation because close
relationship with the United States might improve the security
perception of the countries.
Table 2. U.S. IMET Participation and MID Initiation, 1976 - 2007
(7)
IMET
Spending

VARIABLES

(8)
Other Aid

IMET

(9)
IMET
Binary

-0.144***
(0.0278)

IMET (spend.)

-0.0765***
(0.0202)

Other Aid

3.634**
(1.533)
-0.181
-0.287
(0.191)
(0.192)
0.189
0.177
(0.161)
(0.161)
-0.162
-0.231
(0.155)
(0.153)
-0.342*
-0.391**
(0.191)
(0.187)
1.39e-08**
1.73e(6.60e-09)
08***
(6.39e-09)
-0.0006*
-0.0006*
(0.0004)
(0.0003)
1.31e-05
1.04e-05
(8.25e-06) (8.10e-06)
4.51e-06*** 3.92e-06**
(1.74e-06)
(1.52e-06)

Nonaggression
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.

Army size
Iron/Steel
Total Pop.

(11)
IMET
Spending

-0.821***
(0.180)

IMET (stud.)

Defense

(10)
IMET
Students

4.801***
(1.664)
-0.278
(0.195)
0.107
(0.162)
-0.192
(0.156)
-0.274
(0.191)
1.45e-08**
(6.76e-09)
-0.0007**
(0.004)
1.88e-05**
(8.45e-06)
5.02e-06***
(1.76e-06)

4.980***
(1.715)
-0.299
(0.195)
0.113
(0.163)
-0.151
(0.156)
-0.302
(0.192)
1.19e-08*
(6.75e-09)

-0.0847***
(0.0204)
4.735***
(1.684)
-0.273
(0.195)
0.128
(0.162)
-0.170
(0.156)
-0.294
(0.191)
1.29e-08*
(6.66e-09)

-0.0007**
-0.0007**
(0.0004)
(0.0004)
2.20e-05*** 1.92e-05**
(8.53e-06)
(8.45e-06)
5.01e-06*** 4.93e-06***
(1.88e-06)
(1.81e-06)
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GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

-0***
(0)
-0.0914
(0.198)
0.887***
(0.162)
-0.425
(0.326)
-0.948***
(0.217)
2.045***
(0.214)

-0**
(0)
-0.108
(0.201)
0.786***
(0.157)
-0.146
(0.303)
-0.880***
(0.217)
1.638***
(0.221)

-0***
(0)
0.0391
(0.206)
0.895***
(0.164)
-0.530
(0.328)
-0.811***
(0.221)
2.061***
(0.250)

-0***
(0)
0.111
(0.208)
1.008***
(0.168)
-0.608*
(0.328)
-0.900***
(0.222)
1.677***
(0.229)

-0***
(0)
0.0445
(0.206)
0.928***
(0.164)
-0.507
(0.325)
-0.849***
(0.220)
1.778***
(0.231)

2,696

2,696

2,696

2,696

2,696

Source: Author

Next, the analysis employs another 11 models (Model 12 to 22) to assess
the relationship between U.S. IMET participation and MID escalation.
Table 3 and Table 4 depict the results of these models. Besides the
hostility level as the dependent variable the eleven ordered logistic
regression models, contain the same explanatory and control variables
as the models in Table 1 and Table 2.
Table 3. U.S. IMET Participation and MID Escalation, 1976 - 2007
(12)
IMET
Binary

VARIABLES
IMET

(13)
IMET
Students

(14)
IMET
Spending

(15)
Other Aid

-0.127**
(0.0618)

IMET (stud.)
IMET (spend.)
Other Aid
Defense
Non-aggression
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.
Army size
Iron/Steel

(16)
IMET
Binary
-0.130
(0.0806)

-0.0390***
(0.00966)
-0.0215***
(0.00697)
0.519
(0.441)
0.0124
(0.0934)
0.138
(0.0903)
-0.0624
(0.0828)
-0.385***
(0.0959)
-1.62e-08***
(2.69e-09)
0.001***
(0.0002)
-1.52e-05***
(2.45e-06)
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Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap.
U.S. Affinity
Constant

2.045***
(0.214)

Observations

1.638***
(0.221)

2.061***
(0.250)

1.677***
(0.229)

3,558

3,558

2,863

3,558

-1.45e-07
(2.71e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0628
(0.108)
0.254***
(0.0842)
-0.0857
(0.149)
-0.0409
(0.116)
1.778***
(0.231)
2,696

Source: Author

Once again, the results reflect the expected negative relationship
between U.S. IMET participation and escalation, which provide support
to H2 and H2a. The models show that the other U.S. military aid
variable does not have significant effects on conflict escalation and the
results are mixed. Furthermore, while alliance membership has no
effect on whether a country escalates on going MIDs to higher levels of
hostilities neutral countries are less likely to escalate interstate
disputes. The same relationship seems to exist between the size of
military expenditure, iron, steel production capability, and total
population size and MID escalation. At the same time states with larger
armies and higher GDPs seems to be more likely to escalate MIDs once
they are involved in a conflict. Finally, those countries that are involved
in civil wars are also more likely to escalate MIDs. The results of the
two sets of models provide strong support to the proposed theory. U.S.
IMET participation consistently and significantly decreases the
probability of MID initiation as well as conflict escalation.
Table 4. U.S. IMET Participation and MID Escalation, 1976 - 2007
VARIABLES

(17)
IMET
Students

(18)
IMET
Spending

(19)
Other Aid

IMET
IMET (stu.)

(20)
IMET
Binary

(21)
IMET
Students

(22)
IMET
Spending

-0.128
(0.0806)
-0.0730***
(0.0133)

IMET (spend.)
Other Aid

-0.0729***
(0.0133)
-0.0379***
(0.00965)
-0.526
(0.541)

-0.507
(0.543)

-0.509
(0.549)

-0.0378***
(0.00965)
-0.503
(0.547)
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Defense
Nonaggression
Entente
Neutrality
Military Exp.

Army size
Iron/Steel

Total Pop.
GDP
Democracy
Civil war
Nuclear Cap
U.S. Affinity
Constant
Observations

0.0237
(0.0936)
0.121

0.0239
(0.0936)
0.128

0.0137
(0.0935)
0.156*

0.0189
(0.0936)
0.148

0.0301
(0.0939)
0.131

0.0302
(0.0938)
0.139

(0.0906)
-0.0508
(0.0829)
-0.333***
(0.0960)
-1.99e08***
(2.76e-09)
0.00142***
(0.000165)
-1.40e05***
(2.38e-06)
-3.07e-07
(2.72e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.00740
(0.108)
0.361***
(0.0865)
-0.128
(0.149)
-0.0907
(0.116)
1.972***
(0.209)

(0.0904)
-0.0548
(0.0828)
-0.349***
(0.0961)
-1.86e08***
(2.76e-09)
0.00137***
(0.000164)
-1.45e05***
(2.41e-06)
-2.21e-07
(2.71e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0330
(0.108)
0.312***
(0.0856)
-0.0953
(0.149)
-0.0696
(0.116)
2.045***
(0.214)

(0.0908)
-0.0623
(0.0828)
-0.420***
(0.0956)
-1.54e08***
(2.65e-09)
0.00131***
(0.000164)
-1.55e-05***

(0.0912)
-0.0497
(0.0829)
-0.344***
(0.0967)
-1.98e-08***

(2.48e-06)
-1.33e-07
(2.71e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0864
(0.108)
0.228***
(0.0827)
-0.0853
(0.149)
-0.0455
(0.116)
1.638***
(0.221)

(0.0910)
-0.0614
(0.0828)
-0.397***
(0.0967)
-1.62e08***
(2.70e-09)
0.00132***
(0.000164)
-1.53e05***
(2.47e-06)
-1.31e-07
(2.71e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0708
(0.108)
0.252***
(0.0842)
-0.0969
(0.149)
-0.0510
(0.116)
2.061***
(0.250)

(2.40e-06)
-2.93e-07
(2.72e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0153
(0.108)
0.359***
(0.0865)
-0.139
(0.149)
-0.101
(0.117)
1.677***
(0.229)

(0.0911)
-0.0538
(0.0828)
-0.360***
(0.0969)
-1.85e08***
(2.76e-09)
0.00137***
(0.000165)
-1.46e05***
(2.43e-06)
-2.07e-07
(2.72e-07)
0***
(0)
-0.0410
(0.108)
0.311***
(0.0856)
-0.106
(0.149)
-0.0793
(0.117)
1.778***
(0.231)

2,696

2,696

2,696

2,696

2,696

2,696

(2.76e-09)
0.00141***
(0.000165)
-1.42e-05***

Source: Author

Potential Criticism and Alternative Explanations
Some critics of this study might suggest several potential limitations
regarding the analysis. First, some might argue that the results of the
statistical models are simply statistical artifacts, or the United States
simply provides more aid in the form of U.S. IMET programs to
countries that are less conflict prone. In other words, states might not
be less aggressive because they are getting US military aid in the form
of U.S. IMET programs, but rather they are getting U.S. IMET support
because they are less likely to initiate conflict anyway. However, this
explanation does not seem to be plausible, because a thorough analysis
of the U.S. IMET recipients found in the dataset clearly demonstrate
that there is no clear pattern in the allocation of U.S. IMET support.
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Historically, the United States has provided U.S. IMET support to both
aggressive countries and states that have never initiated interstate
conflicts.
Other critics might argue that U.S. IMET recipient countries simply do
not initiate or escalate MIDs because they do not want to lose the free
and the best military education and training available to them. This
argument indeed seems appealing, however if one looks at the number
of students of these programs even in case of the largest recipient only
a small percentage of its military personnel goes through the U.S. IMET
programs. The same is true when one compares the dollar value of the
U.S. IMET programs to the recipient states’ overall military
expenditure. These factors make it highly unlikely that countries would
not pursue their foreign policy goals in fear of losing some seats in the
U.S. IMET programs. However, this argument brings up another
challenge. If indeed, only several officers and non-commissioned
officers attend the U.S. IMET programs from the recipient countries
than how realistic it is to claim that U.S. IMET programs have
significant effects on the recipient countries’ political decision-making
process.
This article suggests that U.S. IMET program participation can
potentially have effects on the recipient countries’ political decisionmaking process and through that their international conflict behavior
for several reasons. First, the idea behind the U.S. IMET programs is
the so-called, train-the-trainer concept. This concept focuses on
training people who can train and educate additional personnel when
they return to their home countries about the norms and values they
learn in the U.S. IMET programs. This process is similar to the spread
of a disease. One contract the virus spreads it to others and soon many
people are infected. Second, a major part of the U.S. IMET programs is
focusing on professional military education for senior level military
decision makers. The U.S. IMET programs graduates frequently return
to their home countries to assume key policy positions (senior advisors
to politicians, Chief of Defenses, Service Commanders) which enables
them to inject themselves into foreign policy related decision-making
processes. Finally, there is a selection process preceding U.S. IMET
participation. Countries usually send participants who are candidates
of key positions upon their returns, which once again allow U.S. IMET
programs to influence foreign militaries and through them the behavior
of countries.
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Since this study is the first among much needed analyses assessing the
relationship between U.S. military aid in the form of foreign military
education and training programs and recipient states’ international
conflict behavior there are numerous questions it does not address
efficiently or at all. Stronger theoretical foundations for military norm
transmission, better discussion of casual mechanisms, qualitative
analysis of specific cases and better data are just some elements that
need significant efforts from scholars to help better understand the
investigated relationship.

Conclusion
United States has been using foreign military aid programs for decades
to influence recipient states’ behavior in support of U.S. foreign policy
goals. Understanding the effects of U.S. military aid has attracted some
scholarly attention but this interest has been mostly limited to the
exploration of how military aid in the form of arms and equipment
transfers influence the behavior of recipient states’ international
conflict behavior. This article contributes to the literature of U.S.
military aid but approaches the question from a new angle. It assesses
the effects of U.S. military aid in the form U.S. IMET programs on
recipient states’ international conflict behavior.
The findings of this analysis provide support to the proposed argument
that U.S. IMET support is associated with decreasing probability of
both MID initiation and escalation. Additionally, the findings provide
some support to several prior studies’ arguments while refuting the
findings of others. While the analysis shows that U.S. military aid in the
form of arms and equipment transfers is indeed associated with an
increased probability of recipient states becoming the instigators of
MIDs the analysis did not find support for the potential role that
alliances play in conflict initiation. The results of the analysis provide
support to those earlier works arguing that there is a positive
relationship between national capabilities and the presence of civil
conflicts, and the probability of becoming MID initiator. The findings
of this analysis also show that wealthier countries are less likely to start
interstate conflicts. In addition to these contributions to the ongoing
scholarly debate, the findings of this analysis also have some significant
policy implications.
The study provides direct feedback about the effectiveness of the U.S.
IMET programs and with that make, some initial contributions to the
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requirement codified in 2017 Defense Authorization Act directing the
U.S. Department of Defense to assess all foreign military aid programs.
The results of this study provide strong evidence that the U.S. IMET
programs fulfill their goals by contributing to regional security and
reducing the likelihood of interstate conflicts. The findings of this
article might urge policy makers to consider paying more attention to
this less tangible form of U.S. military aid and invest more efforts and
resources to support and to improve these programs further.
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